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EXTENSION AND SELF-CONNECTION
BEN BLUMSON AND MANIKARAN SINGH
Abstract. If two self-connected individuals are connected, it follows
in classical extensional mereotopology that the sum of those individuals
is self-connected too. Since mainland Europe and mainland Asia, for
example, are both self-connected and connected to each other, main-
land Eurasia is also self-connected. In contrast, in non-extensional
mereotopologies, two individuals may have more than one sum, in which
case it does not follow from their being self-connected and connected
that the sum of those individuals is self-connected too. Nevertheless, one
would still expect it to follow that a sum of connected self-connected in-
dividuals is self-connected too. In this paper, we present some surprising
countermodels which show that this conjecture is incorrect.
1. Introduction
According to classical extensional mereology, for any things, there is ex-
actly one thing they compose. In other words, classical extensional mere-
ology combines two theses – extensionalism, according to which no things
compose more than one thing, and universalism, according to which all
things compose at least one thing.1 So according to classical extensional
mereology the North Island and the South Island, for example, compose New
Zealand, in accordance with universalism, and nothing but New Zealand, in
accordance with extensionalism.
Classical extensional mereology is famously unable to distinguish individ-
uals which are scattered – such as New Zealand – from individuals which
are self-connected – such as the Australian mainland. A standard solution
Date: July 8, 2021.
1For this characterisation see, for example, Lewis 1991, p. 74 and Lando 2018.
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is to introduce the relation of connection as an additional primitive, and
to axiomatize its interaction with the parthood relation, thus leading to a
corresponding mereotopology.2 Then mainland Australia is self-connected
whereas New Zealand is not, for example, because New Zealand can be di-
vided into two disconnected parts – the South and North Islands – whereas
mainland Australia cannot.
In the resulting theory, known as classical extensional mereotopology,
this strategy works well. In particular, it’s a theorem that if two individuals
are self-connected, and connected to each other, then the sum of the two
individuals is self-connected too.3 Take, for example, mainland Asia and
mainland Europe, which are both self-connected, and connected to each
other. Then, as we shall see, it follows from universalism that mainland
Eurasia exists and from extensionalism that it is self-connected.
However, both universalism and extensionalism are very controversial.
Universalism is controversial, since it requires that all things compose at
least one thing, no matter how scattered or different they are. But this
entails the existence of many strange things – for example, that there is
something composed of a trout and a turkey, or my hands and my laptop.4
Denying that things which are scattered – like trouts and turkeys – compose
does not undermine the theorem, but denying that connected things – like
my hands and my laptop – compose does.
Nevertheless, it’s unsurprising that in mereotopologies which reject uni-
versalism, some pairs of connected self-connected individuals may not have a
unique self-connected sum, because they may have no sum at all. Although
my laptop and I, for example, are both self-connected, and connected to
each other (as my fingers are touching its keys right now), in the absence
2See Varzi 1996, pp. 270–6 and Casati and Varzi 1999, pp. 52–62.
3See Varzi 1996, p. 271 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 58.
4The trout-turkey example is from Lewis 1991, pp. 79–80.
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of universalism it does not follow that the sum of my laptop and I is self-
connected, since it does not even follow that the sum of my laptop and I
exists.
Extensionalism is controversial mainly because of the way mereology in-
teracts with time and modality. Consider, for example, the United Kingdom,
which includes Northern Island, and Great Britain, which does not. Intu-
itively, it’s possible that Northern Ireland could leave the United Kingdom,
in which case, intuitively, the United Kingdom and Great Britain would
have all the same proper parts. Extensionalism would then predict that the
United Kingdom and Great Britain are identical. But that would conflict
with the necessity of distinctness.5
If extensionalism is false, then two individuals can have more than one
sum – if Northern Ireland left the United Kingdom, for example, then North-
ern and Southern Britain, for example, would sum not only to Great Britain,
but also to the United Kingdom. So it’s unsurprising that in mereotopologies
which reject extensionalism, some pairs of connected self-connected individ-
uals may not have unique self-connected sums, not because any of their sums
might not be self-connected, but simply because their self-connected sums
might not be unique.
Nevertheless, one would expect that in mereotopologies which accept uni-
versalism and reject extensionalism, every pair of connected self-connected
individuals have at least one self-connected sum, even if it is not unique.
If Northern and Southern Britain, for example, were both to sum to the
United Kingdom and to sum to Great Britain then, if Northern and South-
ern Britain are both self-connected and connected to each other, we would
expect at least one of the United Kingdom and Great Britain to be self-
connected too. (In fact, we would expect both the United Kingdom and
Great Britain to be self-connected.)
5For a similar example see Lewis 1986, pp. 248–9.
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In this paper, we show that this conjecture is not provable from standard
axiomatizations of non-extensional mereology. Very roughly, the underlying
problem is that because there are more sums in non-extensional mereology,
there are also more ways to divide things into sums, and so more ways in
which something may fail to be self-connected. If Belgium and the Nether-
lands, for example, had two sums, then Benelux may fail to be self-connected
if one of these sums, but not the other, does not connect to Luxembourg.
There is one axiomatization of non-extensional mereology which escapes
the problem. According to the mutual parts view, some things can compose
more than one thing, as long as the things they compose are parts of one
another.6 If Northern Ireland left the United Kingdom, for example, then
according to this view Great Britain and the United Kingdom would still be
distinct, but in addition to Great Britain being part of the United Kingdom,
the United Kingdom would also be part of Great Britain. In other words,
the United Kingdom and Great Britain would both be distinct parts of each
other, or mutual parts.
Sections 2-4 reviews the axioms of classical extensional mereology and
its non-extensional rivals. Section 5 does the same for the relevant axioms
and definitions of mereotopology, and proves that every pair of connected
self-connected individuals has a self-connected sum in closed extensional
mereotopology. Section 6 presents countermodels in closed mereotopology.
Section 7 presents similar countermodels in general minimal mereotopology.
Finally section 8 proves the theorem in general supplemented premereotopol-
ogy, an axiomatization of the mutual parts view.
2. Extensional Mereology
In this section, we review the axioms of extensional mereology, and some
of its weaker variations, especially minimal mereology and the mutual parts
view. We begin by adopting a single primitive relation P , where Pxy is
6See, for example, Cotnoir 2010, 2016; Parsons n.d.; Thomson 1998, p. 155.
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interpreted as meaning x is an (improper) part of y.7 It’s usually assumed
that parthood is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive:
(1) Pxx Reflexivity
(2) Pxy ∧ Pyx→ x = y Antisymmetry
(3) Pxy ∧ Pyz → Pxz Transitivity
Axioms 1-3 constitute the theory known as ground mereology, abbreviated as
M .8 In the current context, reflexivity and transitivity are relatively uncon-
troversial.9 However, antisymmetry is closely connected to extensionalism,
since it entails that things with all and only the same parts are identical.10
We will consider rejecting antisymmetry in section 8, when we discuss the
mutual parts view.
In terms of parthood, we define a proper part as a nonidentical part:
(4) PPxy =def (Pxy ∧ x 6= y) Proper Parthood
So Queensland is a proper part of Australia, for example, since Queensland
is a part of Australia which is not identical to Australia.11
Likewise, overlap is defined as having a part in common:
(5) Oxy ↔ (∃z)(Pzx ∧ Pzy) Overlap
7Following Varzi 1996, pp. 260–1 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 36.
8See Varzi 1996, p. 261 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 38.
9See Kearns 2011 for criticism of reflexivity. Varzi 2006 defends transitivity.
10See Cotnoir 2010, Cotnoir 2016, pp. 127–8 and Cotnoir 2013, pp. 837–9.
11For this definition see, for example, Leonard and Goodman 1940, p. 47 and Si-
mons 1987, p. 11. Proper parthood can also be defined as non-mutual parthood, viz.:
PPxy =def Pxy ∧ ¬Pyx. See, for example, Varzi 1996, p. 261 and Casati and Varzi
1999, p. 36. It follows from antisymmetry that the two definitions are equivalent, but in
non-extensional mereologies which reject antisymmetry, as the mutual-parts view does,
the two definitions can come apart. See especially Cotnoir 2010, p. 398, Parsons 2014,
pp. 6–7 and Cotnoir 2018.
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For example, Egypt overlaps Asia, since there is something – namely, Sinai
– which is part of Egypt and part of Asia.12
With these two definitions, we may state the axiom of weak supplemen-
tation, according to which if something is a proper part of another, there is
some part of the latter which does not overlap the former:
(6) PPxy → (∃z)(Pzy ∧ ¬Ozx) Weak Supplementation
Since Queensland is a proper part of Australia, for example, weak supple-
mentation entails there is some part of Australia – such as, for example,
Tasmania – which does not overlap Queensland.13
Axioms 1-3 together with weak supplementation constitute the theory
known as minimal mereology, and abbreviated as MM (Casati and Varzi
1999, p. 39). The theory is so-called because weak supplementation is sup-
posed to be analytic or, as Peter Simons writes, “constitutive of the meaning
of ‘proper part’” (Simons 1987, p. 116). Nevertheless, weak supplementa-
tion, in combination with reflexivity and transitivity, entails antisymmetry.14
So it is rejected, amongst others, by proponents of the mutual parts view.15
We will return to this issue in section 8.
12For this definition see, for example, Simons 1987, p. 28, Varzi 1996, p. 261 and Casati
and Varzi 1999, p. 36.
13For weak supplementation see Simons 1987, p. 28 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 39.
14For suppose Pxy and Pyx and assume for reductio that x 6= y. Then from Definition
4, x is a proper part of y. From weak supplementation, it follows that there is z which is
part of x but does not overlap y. Then since z is part of x and x is part of y, it follows
from transitivity that z is part of y. But according to reflexivity, y is also part of y, so
z and y overlap. But z and y don’t overlap, which concludes the reductio. See also the
proof in Pietruszczak 2018, p. 155 of his lemma 5.2(iii).
15See Cotnoir 2016, Cotnoir 2018 and Parsons n.d. However, note that if proper part-
hood is defined as non-mutual parthood instead of non-identical parthood, then the corre-
sponding version of weak supplementation is innocuous even according to the mutual parts
view. Weak supplementation is also rejected in mereotopologies inspired by Whitehead.
See Whitehead 1929, pp. 345–53; Clarke 1981; Simons 1987, p. 98; Casati and Varzi 1999,
p. 79 and Cotnoir 2018.
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According to the axiom of strong supplementation, if something is not
part of another, then there is some part of the former which does not overlap
the latter:
(7) ¬Pyx→ (∃z)(Pzy ∧ ¬Ozx) Strong Supplementation
Since Turkey is not part of Asia, for example, strong supplementation entails
there is some part of Turkey – such as, for example, Istanbul – which does
not overlap Asia.16
Axioms 1-3 together with strong supplementation constitute the theory
known as extensional mereology, and abbreviated as EM (Casati and Varzi
1999, p. 39).17 In ground mereology, strong supplementation together with
antisymmetry entails weak supplementation, so minimal mereology is a sub-
theory of extensional mereology (Simons 1987, p. 29; Casati and Varzi 1999,
p. 39).18 However, since proponents of the mutual parts view reject anti-
symmetry, they are willing and able to accept strong supplementation, while
rejecting weak supplementation.19 We will consider this possibility in more
detail when we discuss the mutual parts view in section 8.
3. Closed Mereology
The axioms reviewed so far are mainly aimed at capturing extensionalism;
in this section, we review axioms aimed at capturing universalism. To begin
with, let us say that z is a sum of x and y just in case (∀w)(Owz ↔
16For strong supplementation see Simons 1987, p. 29, Varzi 1996, p. 262 and Casati
and Varzi 1999, p. 39.
17In fact, axiom 1 is redundant in extensional mereology, since it is entailed by axioms
3 and 7. See the proof in Pietruszczak 2018, p. 157 of his lemma 5.7.
18For suppose y is a proper part of x. Then from the definition of proper parthood, y
is part of x and y 6= x. Then suppose for reductio that x is part of y. Then y is part of
x and x is part of y, so from antisymmetry y = x, contradicting that y 6= x. So x is not
part of y. But then it follows from strong supplementation that there is z which is part
of x and does not overlap y. See also the proof in Pietruszczak 2020, p. 31 of his lemma
2.3.5.
19See Cotnoir 2013, pp. 837–8, Cotnoir 2016, p. 127, and Parsons n.d.
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(Owx∨Owy)) or, in other words, all and only things which overlap z overlap
x or y.20 Then according to the axiom of sum closure, every pair has a sum:
(8) (∃z)(∀w)(Owz ↔ (Owx ∨Owy)) Sum Closure21
And if a pair of individuals have a unique sum, then we can define the sum
of those individuals as the thing which is overlapped by all and only things
which overlap either of them:
(9) x+ y = ( ιz)(∀w)(Owz ↔ (Owx ∨Owy)) Sum22
Eurasia is a sum of Europe and Asia, for example, because all and only
things which overlap Eurasia either overlap Europe or else overlap Asia.
And if Eurasia is the only thing overlapped by all and only things which
overlap Europe or overlap Asia, then Eurasia is the sum of Europe and
Asia.
Likewise, let us say that z is a product of x and y just in case (∀w)(Pwz ↔
(Pwx ∧ Pwy)) or, in other words, if and only if all and only parts of z are
part of both x and y. Then according to the axiom of product closure, every
overlapping pair has a product:
20In closed extensional mereology and stronger theories, it would be equivalent to say
that z is a sum of x and y just in case Pxz ∧ Pyz ∧ (∀w)(Pwz → (Owx ∨ Owy)) or,
in other words, x is part of z, y is part of z, and every part of z overlaps x or y. But
in weaker mereological theories, these two formulations of sum may come apart, in ways
which matter to the controversy over whether universalism entails extensionalism. See,
for example, Varzi 2009, p. 601.
21For this version of sum closure, see Masolo and Vieu 1999, p. 238. Varzi 1996,
p. 263 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 43 prefer a slightly weaker version, according to
which two individuals have a sum if they underlap (in other words, if there is some
individual they are both a part of). Corresponding to the stronger definition of sum
in footnote 20, one might prefer a stronger version of sum closure according to which
(∃z)(Pxz ∧ Pyz ∧ (∀w)(Pwz → (Owx ∨Owy))).
22For this definition see, for example, Leonard and Goodman 1940, p. 48, Simons 1987,
p. 13, Varzi 1996, p. 263 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 43. We follow Casati and Varzi
1999, p. 204 in adopting the Russellian treatment of definite descriptions (Whitehead and
Russell 1925, pp. 173–86).
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(10) Oxy → (∃z)(∀w)(Pwz ↔ (Pwx ∧ Pwy)) Product Closure
And if a pair of individuals has a unique product, then we can define the
product of those individuals as the thing all and only parts of which are
parts of both of them:
(11) x× y = ( ιz)(∀w)(Pwz ↔ (Pwx ∧ Pwy)) Product
Sinai is a product of Egypt and Asia, for example, because all and only parts
of Sinai are parts of both Egypt and Asia. And if Sinai is the only thing all
and only parts of which are parts of both Egypt and Asia, then Sinai is the
product of Egypt and Asia.
Ground mereology together with sum and product closure constitutes the
theory known as closed mereology, abbreviated as CM . Similarly, closed
mereology together with minimal mereology constitutes the theory known
as closed minimal mereology, abbreviated as CMM . And closed mereology
together with extensional mereology constitutes the theory known as closed
extensional mereology, abbreviated as CEM .23
Note that in closed extensional mereology, if an individual overlaps two
others, then its product distributes over their sum:
(12) (Oxy ∧Oxz)→ x× (y + z) = (x× y) + (x× z) Distributivity
Since Turkey overlaps Europe and Asia, for example, the product of Turkey
with Eurasia is the sum of the product of Turkey with Europe and the
product of Turkey with Asia.24
It’s a surprising but well known fact that closed minimal mereology and
closed extensional mereology are equivalent, because weak supplementation
in combination with product closure entails strong supplementation.25 This
provides the seed of an argument from universalism, expressed in terms
23See Varzi 1996, p. 263 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 43.
24For proofs see Pietruszczak 2018, pp. 102–4 and Pietruszczak 2020, pp. 81–2.
25See Simons 1987, p. 31 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 44
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of sum and product closure, to extensionalism, expressed in terms of anti-
symmetry and strong supplementation. However, we shall see in the next
section that this argument from universalism to extensionalism is far from
straightforward.
4. General Mereology
Recall that according to universalism, all things compose at least one
thing. To capture this idea in full generality, let us say for any predicate
φ(x) that x is a general sum of the individuals satisfying φ(x) just in case
(∀y)(Oyx↔ (∃z)(φ(z)∧Oyz)) or, in other words, all and only things which
overlap z overlap something satisfying φ(x).26 Then according to the axiom
schema of fusion, if anything satisfies φ(x), there is a general sum of the
things satisfying φ(x):
(13) (∃x)φ(x)→ (∃x)(∀y)(Oyx↔ (∃z)(φ(z) ∧Oyz)) Fusion
If there is an ocean, for example, then there is something – viz., the Ocean
– which is overlapped by all and only things which overlap an ocean.
Ground mereology together with fusion constitutes the theory known as
general mereology, abbreviated as GM . Similarly, general mereology to-
gether with minimal mereology constitutes the theory known as general
minimal mereology, abbreviated as GMM . And general mereology together
with extensional mereology constitutes the theory known as general exten-
sion mereology, abbreviated as GEM .27 GEM is otherwise known as clas-
sical extensional mereology, the paradigmatic mereological theory.
26In classical extensional mereology, it would be equivalent to say that x is a sum of the
individuals satisfying φ(x) just in case (∀y)(φ(y) → Pyx)∧ (∀y)(Pyx→ (∃z)(φ(z)∧Oyz))
or, in other words, everything satisfying φ(x) is part of x and every part of x overlaps
something satisfying φ(x). But in weaker mereological theories, these formulations may
come apart. See Hovda 2009, pp. 57–9 and Varzi 2009, p. 601. We consider a version of
the axiom schema of fusion based on this formulation in section 8.
27See Varzi 1996, p. 265 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 46.
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Since closed minimal mereology is equivalent to closed extensional mere-
ology, it would be natural to conclude that general minimal mereology is
also equivalent to general extensional mereology.28 But it is now well known
that this is not the case, due to the countermodel illustrated by the Hasse
diagram in figure 1.29 In this countermodel, weak supplementation is sat-
isfied but strong supplementation is not, since although, for example, b is
not part of d, there is no part of d which does not overlap b (since all three





Figure 1. Countermodel in GMM
The reason the argument that closed minimal mereology is equivalent to
closed extensional mereology does not extend to show that general minimal
mereology is not equivalent to general extensional mereology is that in the
absence of strong strong supplementation, the fusion axiom fails to entail
product closure.30 Of course, if two individuals overlap, then they have a
common part, so it follows from the fusion axiom that there is a general sum
of their common parts, so we have the following lemma:
(14) Oxy → (∃z)(∀v)(Ovz ↔ (∃w)((Pwx ∧ Pwy) ∧Ovw))
However, the countermodel in figure 1 shows that lemma 14 does not entail
product closure, since although b and d overlap, and both b and d are general
28This mistake is in Simons 1987, p. 37 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 46.
29Simons 1987, p. 28 discusses this model in connection with weak supplementation.
The mistake is corrected in Pietruszczak 2000, translated in Pietruszczak 2005, pp. 228–9,
as well as Pontow 2004 and Hovda 2009. See also Varzi 2009, 2019.
30See Pontow 2004, p. 205 and Hovda 2009, pp. 64–5.
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sums of a and c, which are the common parts of b and d, neither b nor d are
a product of b and d.
This point threatens to undermine the line of argument from universal-
ism to extensionalism considered in the last section. We will reconsider
whether this line of argument can be salvaged in section 8, when we con-
sider a stronger version of the axiom schema of fusion which does entail
product closure and so, in combination with weak supplementation, does
entail strong supplementation. We will then consider the possibility of re-
sisting this argument by accepting strong supplementation, but nevertheless
avoiding extensionalism by denying the antisymmetry of parthood.
5. Mereotopology
In this section, we consider mereotopological theories which combine the
primitive relation P , still interpreted as improper parthood, with an ad-
ditional primitive relation C, where Cxy is interpreted as meaning x is
connected to y.31 It’s assumed that connection is reflexive and symmetric:
(15) Cxx Reflexivity
(16) Cxy → Cyx Symmetry
In addition, it’s assumed that if something is part of another, then everything
connected to the former connects to the latter:
(17) Pxy → (∀z)(Czx→ Czy) Monotonicity
Since Queensland is part of Australia, for example, everything connected to
Queensland is connected to Australia.
Ground mereology together with axioms 15-17 constitutes the theory
known as ground mereotopology, abbreviated as MT .32 Then each mere-
ological theory X combined with MT constitutes a mereotopological theory
31Following Varzi 1996, p. 268 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 52.
32See Varzi 1996, p. 268 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 54.
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XT . For our purposes the most important of these are closed mereotopol-
ogy or CMT , closed extensional mereotopology or CEMT , general mini-
mal mereotopology or GMMT and general extensional mereotopology or
GEMT .33
As we mentioned in the introduction, mereology alone cannot distinguish
between objects which are scattered and objects which are self-connected.
But in mereotopology, an individual can be defined as self-connected if and
only if for every way of dividing it into a sum, its summands are connected:
(18) SCz =def (∀x)(∀y)((∀w)(Owz ↔ (Owx ∨Owy))→ Cxy)
New Zealand, for example, is not self-connected, since New Zealand is a
sum of the South Island and the North Island, but the South Island is not
connected to the North Island.34
In closed extensional mereotopology, the existence and uniqueness of sums
is guaranteed, so Definition 18 is equivalent to the following lemma:
(19) SCz ↔ (∀x)(∀y)(z = x+ y → Cxy)
New Zealand, for example, is not self-connected, since New Zealand is the
sum of the South Island and the North Island, but the South Island and the
North Island are not connected.35
So it is a theorem of closed extensional mereotopology that if two self-
connected individuals are connected, their sum is self-connected too:
(20) (Cxy ∧ SCx ∧ SCy)→ SC(x+ y)
33See Varzi 1996 and Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 57. Casati and Varzi’s formulation of
CMT includes an additional axiom according to which connected individuals underlap
(Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 57). This axiom is not needed here as it is entailed by our
stronger version of the sum closure axiom.
34Given the characterisation of sums in footnote 20, the definition of self-connection
would instead be SCz =def (∀x)(∀y)(Pxz ∧ Pyz ∧ (∀w)(Pwz → (Owx ∨Owy)) → Cxy).
35For this point see Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 58. Varzi 1996, p. 271 uses lemma 19 as
the definition of self-connection.
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Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true. Then to show the consequent,
suppose that x + y = v + w. Then we have to show that Cvw. There are
four cases. In the first case, v and w both overlap x. But then since x is
part of x + y, it follows x is part of v + w, so x = x × (v + w). But from
the distributivity of product over sum, x× (v + w) = (x× v) + (x× w), so
x = (x × v) + (x × w). Then since x is self-connected, C(x × v)(x × w),
and so Cvw. In the second case, v and w both overlap y, and Cvw follows
from the same reasoning as in the first case except with x replaced by y. In
the third case, x does not overlap v and y does not overlap w. Then x = w
and y = v, and Cvw follows because x and y are connected. Likewise in the
fourth case x does not overlap w and y does not overlap v, so x = v and
y = w, and Cvw follows from the same reasoning as in the third case.36 
Via the definition of sums, it’s an obvious corollary, which we call self-
connected sum closure, that if two self-connected individuals are connected,
then they have a self-connected sum:
(21) (Cxy ∧ SCx ∧ SCy)→ (∃z)(SCz ∧ (∀w)(Owz ↔ (Owx ∨Owy)))
There is something self-connected which is overlapped by all and only over-
lappers of Europe or Asia, for example, because Eurasia is overlapped by all
and only overlappers of Europe or Asia.37
It is not surprising that neither lemma 19, theorem 20 nor corollary 21
are provable in extensional mereotopology or weaker, since in the absence
of sum closure, connected self-connected individuals may not have any sum,
self-connected or not. Similarly, it is not surprising that lemma 19 and
theorem 20 are not provable in closed mereotopology or weaker, since in
the absence of strong supplementation, connected self-connected individuals
may not have a unique sum, and so the description abbreviated by x + y
may not be uniquely satisfied.
36For the statement (without proof) of this theorem see Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 58.
37Given the characterisation of sums in footnote 20, self-connected sum closure would
be written (Cxy ∧SCx∧SCy) → (∃z)(SCz ∧Pxz ∧Pyz ∧ (∀w)(Pwz ↔ (Owx∨Owy))).
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However, we would still expect self-connected sum closure to be prov-
able in closed mereotopology and general minimal mereotopology, since sum
closure ensures that connected self-connected individuals have at least one
sum, which one would expect to be self-connected according to the origi-
nal definition of self-connection, since it does not require a unique sum.38
The following two sections present surprising countermodels to demonstrate
that this conjecture is false, and self-connected sum closure is not a theorem
either of closed mereotopology or general minimal mereotopology.
6. Closed Mereotopology
In this section, we present a countermodel to show that self-connected
sum closure is not a theorem of closed mereotopology. Suppose there are
just four individuals, a, b, c and d. And suppose that a and c are proper
parts of b, that d is also a proper part of c, and that a is not part of c or
d, as illustrated by the Hasse diagram in figure 2a. Moreover, suppose that
a is connected to c, but not connected to d, as illustrated by the graph in
figure 2b. Then a is self-connected, c is self-connected, and a is connected











Figure 2. Countermodel in closed mereotopology
Nevertheless, a and c do not satisfy the consequent of self-connected sum
closure. Of course, a and c do have a sum in the model, since something
overlaps b if and only if it overlaps a or overlaps c. In other words, b is a
38For the (incorrect) claim that self-connected sum closure is a theorem of closed
mereotopology see Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 58.
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sum of a and c. The problem is that b is not self-connected, because b is
also a sum of a and d – in other words, something overlaps b if and only if
it overlaps a or overlaps d – but a is not connected to d. Moreover, nothing
other than b is a sum of a and c, so nothing else satisfies the consequent of
self-connected sum closure either.39
There are at least two counterintuitive features of the countermodel.
First, it violates weak supplementation, because d is a proper part of c,
but there is no part of c which does not overlap d. Adding weak supple-
mentation to closed mereotopology obtains closed minimal mereotopology,
which is equivalent to closed extensional mereotopology, and so would be
strong enough to entail self-connected sum closure. However, in section 7,
we will show that in general minimal mereotopology there are countermodels
to self-connected sum closure that do satisfy weak supplementation.
Second, it’s counterintuitive that a is connected to c, without being con-
nected to d, the only proper part of c. This suggests we might rule out the
countermodel by adding an axiom, which we call demonotonicity, according
to which if an individual is connected to a complex, then it is connected to
a proper part of that complex, viz.:
(22) (∃z)PPzx→ (∀y)(Cyx→ (∃z)(PPzx ∧ Cyz)) Demonotonicity
Suppose, for example, that an ax has two proper parts – its handle and its
blade. Then nothing can be connected to the ax without being connected
to either the handle or the blade.40
However, the addition of axiom 22 is still too weak to entail self-connected
sum closure. For suppose there are countably many individuals a, b, c0, c1,
39Note that the countermodel still works given the characterisation of sum in footnote
20. In this case b is still the (unique) sum of a and c because a is part of b, c is part of
b, and everything which is part of b overlaps a or c. But b is also still a sum of a and d,
since a is part of b, d is part of b and every part of b overlaps a or overlaps d. And so b
still fails to be self-connected, because a and d are not connected.
40See Blumson and Singh 2020, p. 123 for discussion of this axiom.
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c2, ..., cω. And suppose again that a and c are proper parts of b, that a
is not part of any cn, but that each cn+1 is an immediate proper part of
each cn, and suppose cω is a proper part of every cn, as illustrated by the
Hasse diagram in figure 3a. Moreover, let us say that two individuals are
externally connected just in case they are connected but not overlapping.41
And suppose that a is externally connected to every cn, but not externally
connected to cω, and that nothing else is externally connected, as illustrated















Figure 3. Countermodel in closed mereotopology with 22
In this countermodel a is self-connected, c0 is self-connected, and a is
connected to c0, so the antecedent of self-connected sum closure is satisfied
by a and c0. Nevertheless, a and c0 do not satisfy the consequent of self-
connected sum closure. Of course, a and c0 do have a sum in the model,
namely b. The problem is that b is not self-connected, because b is also a sum
of a and cω, but a is not connected to cω. Moreover, nothing other than b is
a sum of a and c0, so nothing else satisfies the consequent of self-connected
sum closure either.43
41See Varzi 1996, p. 268 and Casati and Varzi 1999, pp. 54–5.
42Cotnoir 2016, p. 126 suggests the purpose of supplementation principles is partly to
rule out models of this kind.
43Note that the countermodel still works if we characterize sums as in footnote 20.
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In order to rule out this countermodel, we could adopt as an axiom a
stronger version of demonotonicity, which we call atomic demonotonicity,
according to which if something is connected to another, then the former is
connected to a part of the latter which has no proper parts:
(23) Cxy → (∃z)(Pzy ∧ ¬(∃v)PPvz ∧ Cxz) Atomic Demonotonicity
The addition of this axiom would rule out the counterexample in figure 3,
since in order for a to be connected to c0, it would follow from atomic de-
monotonicity that it is also connected to cω, and then from the monotonicity
of connection that a is also connected to each cn.
44
In general, the addition of atomic demonotonicity as an axiom of closed
mereotopology would entail self-connected sum closure via the following
lemma, which we call coincidence implies connection, according to which
if two individuals have all and only the same overlappers, then they are also
connected to all and only the same individuals:
(24) (∀z)(Ozx↔ Ozy)→ (∀z)(Czx↔ Czy)
Proof. Suppose all and only things which overlap x overlap y. And suppose
z is connected to x. Then from Axiom 23, z is connected to a part v of
x which has no proper parts. Since v is part of x, and parthood implies
overlap, v overlaps x. So v also overlaps y. From the definition of overlap,
something is part of both v and y. But since v has no proper parts, v itself
is part of y. Then since z is connected to v, it follows from monotonicity
that z is connected to y. Mutatis mutandis, if z is connected to y, then z is
connected to x. So all and only things connected to x connect to y. 
From coincidence implies connection, we can prove self-connected sum clo-
sure by an argument similar to the proof of theorem 20 in closed extensional
mereotopology, except without assuming that sums are unique. For suppose
x is self-connected, y is self-connected and x is connected to y. Then from
sum closure, there is a sum z of x and y. To show that z is self-connected,
44For discussion of atomic demonotonicity see Blumson and Singh 2020, p. 123.
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suppose that z is a sum of v and w. Then there are four cases. In the first
case, v and w both overlap x. Then x is a sum of x× v and x×w. Since x
is self-connected, x × v is connected to x × w, so from the monotonicity of
parthood v is connected to w. In the second case, v and w both overlap y,
and the reasoning is the same as in the first case except with x replaced by
y. In the third case, x does not overlap v and y does not overlap w. Then
all and only things which overlap x overlap v and all and only things which
overlap y overlap w. So from lemma 24, coincidence implies connection, all
and only things connected to x are connected to v and all and only things
connected to y are connected to w. But then since x is connected to y, v is
connected to w. Finally, in the fourth case x does not overlap w and y does
not overlap v, and the reasoning is as in the third case except that x and y
are interchanged.
7. General Minimal Mereotopology
The previous countermodels in closed mereotopology are excluded in gen-
eral minimal mereotopology by the axiom of weak supplementation. And
since the sum closure axiom follows from the fusion axiom, every reason
we had to expect self-connected sum closure to be a theorem of closed
mereotopology, we also had as a reason to expect it to be a theorem of
general minimal mereotopology too. Nevertheless, for similar reasons, self-
connected sum closure is not a theorem of general minimal mereotopology
either, as the following countermodel shows.
Suppose that there are three simple individuals, f , g and h. And suppose
that f and h uniquely compose d, that g and h uniquely compose e, but
that f and g compose two individuals, b and c, and that all the individuals
taken together compose a, as illustrated by the Hasse diagram in figure 4a.
Moreover, suppose f is externally connected to g and h is externally con-
nected to c, but no other individuals are externally connected, as illustrated
by the graph in figure 4b. Then c is self-connected and h is self-connected
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Figure 4. Countermodel in general minimal mereotopology
Nevertheless, c and h do not satisfy the consequent of self-connected sum
closure. Of course, c and h do have a sum in the model, since a is overlapped
by all and only overlappers of c or overlappers of h. In other words, a is a
sum of c and h. The problem is that a is not self-connected, because a is
also a sum of b and h – in other words, something overlaps a if and only if
it overlaps b or overlaps h – but b is not connected to h. Moreover, nothing
else in the model is a sum of c and h, so nothing else satisfies the consequent
of self-connected sum closure either.45
As in the previous section, there are at least two counterintuitive features
of the countermodel. First, it violates strong supplementation – although b
is not a part of c, for example, there is no part of b that does not overlap c.
This violation of strong supplementation allows f and g to have two sums,
45Note that given the characterisation of sum in footnote 20, a is still the (unique) sum
of c and h because c is part of a, h is part of a, and everything which is part of a overlaps
c or h. But a is also still a sum of b and h, since b is part of a, h is part of a and every
part of a overlaps b or overlaps h. And so a still fails to be self-connected, because b and
h are not connected. However, notice that not everything in the model has a sum in the
sense of footnote 20. In particular, although b and c are both part of a, not every part of
a overlaps b or overlaps c, since h is part of a but does not overlap b or c (in the weaker
sense of sum b and c have two sums, b and c themselves). So this countermodel is ruled
out by axiom 26, which we discuss in section 8.
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which is in turn what allows c to be be connected to h without a being self-
connected. In contrast, we will show in section 8 that on the mutual parts
view, which rejects extensionalism but accepts strong supplementation, self-
connected sum closure is provable.
Second, it’s counterintuitive that h is connected to c, without being con-
nected to f or g, the proper parts of c. This suggests again that we might
rule out the countermodel by adding axiom 22, demonotonicity, according
to which an individual is connected to a complex only if it connects to one of
its proper parts, as an additional axiom of general minimal mereotopology.
However, for the same reason as in the previous section, the addition of de-
monotonicity as an axiom is too weak to entail self-connected sum closure,
as the following countermodel shows.
Suppose there are countably many individuals a, b0, b1, ..., bn, ..., bω,
bω+1, c0, c1, ..., cn, ..., cω, cω+1, d, e and h, such that each bn+1 is an
immediate part of each bn and cn, bω+1 is an immediate part of bω, d and
cω, each cn+1 is an immediate part of each cn and bn, cω+1 is an immediate
part of cω, bω and e, h is an immediate part of d and e, b0, c0, d and e are
immediate parts of a, and bω and cω are part of each cn and bn, as illustrated
in the Hasse diagram in figure 5a. And suppose bω+1 is externally connected
to cω+1, and h is externally connected to each bn and cn, but nothing else
is externally connected, as illustrated by the graph in figure 5b.
Then c0 is self-connected and h is self-connected, and c0 is connected to h,
so c0 and h satisfy the antecedent of self-connected sum closure. Moreover,
c0 and h have a sum a. However, a is not self-connected, because it is also a
sum of bω and h, and bω is not connected to h. Since c0 and h do not have
any other sum apart from a, the consequent of self connected sum-closure is
not satisfied, and so self-connected sum closure is not a theorem of general
minimal mereotopology, even with demonotonicity as an additional axiom.
In order to rule out this countermodel, we could add to general minimal
mereotopology the stronger axiom 23, atomic demonotonicity. This would



















Figure 5. Countermodel in GMM with axiom 22
rule out the counterexample, since it would require that in order to be
connected to each cn, h must be connected to bω+1 or cω+1, and thus by the
monotonicity of connection to bω and cω as well. In general, the addition
of atomic demonotonicity to general minimal mereotopology would entail
lemma 24, coincidence implies connection, by the same proof as in closed
mereotopology.
Then from coincidence implies connection, we could prove self-connected
sum closure by an argument similar to the proof of theorem 20 in closed
extensional mereotopology. However, as well as being unable to assume the
uniqueness of sums, we cannot assume the existence of products, even of
overlapping individuals. But, if two individuals overlap, we can assume the
existence of a general sum of their common parts, in accordance with lemma
14. Then from atomic demonotonicity we can prove that if an individual is
connected to a general sum of the common parts of x and y, then it is also
connected to x (as well as to y), in accordance with the following lemma:
(25) Csz ∧ (∀v)(Ovz ↔ (∃w)((Pwx ∧ Pwy) ∧Ovw)))→ Csx
Proof. Suppose the antecedent. Since s is connected to z, it follows from
atomic demonotonicity that there is some a with no proper parts which is
EXTENSION AND SELF-CONNECTION 23
part of z and connected to s. Since a is part of z, a overlaps z. So there
is a common part w of x and y which overlaps a. Since a overlaps w, a
and w have a common part. But since a has no proper parts, this common
part must be a itself, and so a is part of w. But w is part of x, so from the
transitivity of parthood a is part of x. Moreover, since s is connected to a,
it follows from the monotonicity of connection that s is connected to x. 
Finally, to complete the proof of self-connected sum closure in general
minimal mereotopology with atomic demonotonicity, suppose again that x
is self-connected, y is self-connected and x is connected to y. From sum
closure, there is a sum z of x and y. To show z is self-connected, suppose
that z is a sum of v and w. Then there are four cases. In the first case,
v and w both overlap x. From lemma 14 there is a general sum s of the
common parts of x and v and a general sum t of the common parts of x and
w. Moreover x is a sum of s and t, so since x is self-connected s is connected
to t. From two applications of lemma 25, it follows that v is connected to w.
In the second case, v and w both overlap y, and the reasoning is the same
as in the first case except with x replaced by y. And the third and fourth
cases are the same as in section 6.
8. The Mutual Parts View
Recall from section 4 that the argument from universalism to extension-
alism fails in general minimal mereology, since in the absence of strong sup-
plementation the axiom schema of fusion does not entail product closure.
That suggests adopting the following stronger form of the axiom schema of
fusion:
(26) (∃x)φ(x)  (∃x)((∀y)(φ(y)  Pyx)∧(∀y)(Pyx  (∃z)(φ(z)∧Oyz)))
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If there is an ocean, for example, there is something, viz. the Ocean, such
that every ocean is part of it, and such that every part of it overlaps an
ocean.46
Together with the axioms of minimal mereology, this stronger version of
the fusion axiom schema entails both strong supplementation and product
closure, so that the theory resulting from adding axiom 26 to minimal mere-
ology is equivalent to general extensional mereology.47 So by adopting axiom
schema 26 in place of axiom schema 13, proponents of extensional mereology
may be able to salvage the argument from universalism to extensionalism
mooted in section 3. How should proponents of non-extensional mereology
respond to this new version of the argument?
According to the mutual parts view, instead of resisting adopting axiom
schema 26, non-extensionalists should accept both it and strong supplemen-
tation, but reject weak supplementation and antisymmetry.48 To understand
the mutual parts view, it’s helpful to contrast the model illustrated by the
Hasse diagram in figure 1 with that illustrated by the directed graph of the
parthood relation in figure 6.49 In figure 1, strong supplementation was not
satisfied because although b was not a part of d, there wasn’t any part of b
which didn’t overlap d (and vice versa).
But in figure 6, strong supplementation is satisfied since although there
isn’t any part of b which doesn’t overlap d, b is part of d (and vice versa).
Nevertheless, by denying the antisymmetry of parthood, the model avoids
extensionalism, since although b and d have all and only the same parts,
and overlap all and only the same things, b and d are not identical. In other
46For this version of the fusion axiom see, for example, Lesniewski 1992; Tarski 1983,
p. 25; Lewis 1991, pp. 73–4 and Hovda 2009, p. 62. This version of the fusion axiom
corresponds to the formulation of general sums in footnote 26.
47For proofs and detailed discussion see Hovda 2009, pp. 65–67.
48See Cotnoir 2010, 2016, 2018 and Parsons n.d.
49See Cotnoir 2010, p. 399 and Cotnoir 2016, p. 127.





Figure 6. The Mutual Parts View
words, extensionalism is false in the model since a and c compose more than
two things, viz. b and d.
Axiomatically, axiom 1 reflexivity, axiom 3 transitivity, axiom 7 strong
supplementation and axiom schema 13 fusion constitute the theory of gen-
eral supplemented premereology, which we abbreviate as GSPM .50 Since
axiom schema 26 is a theorem of GSPM , and entails axiom schema 13, an
equivalent axiomatization could be obtained by swapping axiom schema 13
for axiom schema 26. GSPM combined with axiom 15 reflexivity, axiom
16 symmetry and axiom 17 monotonicity of connection constitutes general
supplemented premereotopology, which we abbreviate GSPMT .
Both sum closure and product closure are theorems of GSPM . But nei-
ther sums nor products are unique. In the model illustrated in figure 6,
for example, a and c have two sums b and d. And b and d have two prod-
ucts, b and d. Nevertheless, self-connected sum closure is still derivable
in general supplemented premereotopology via lemma 24, coincidence im-
plies connection. Moreover coincidence implies connection can be proved in
general supplemented premereotopology without any additional axiom, so
neither demonotonicity nor atomic demonotonicity need be adopted in order
to prove self-connected sum closure within the mutual parts view.
To prove coincidence implies connection, suppose that all and only indi-
viduals overlapping x overlap y. It follows that x is part of y. For suppose
for reductio x is not part of y. Then from strong supplementation, there is
50Parsons n.d., p. 8 names this theory sum-complete supplemented preordering, which
he abbreviates as SSPO. See also Cotnoir 2016, p. 129 for this axiomatization.
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some part of x which does not overlap y, contradicting the assumption that
all individuals overlapping x overlap y. Mutatis mutandis, y is part of x.
Now to show that all and only individuals connected to x are connected to
y, suppose z is connected to x. Since x is part of y, it follows from demono-
tonicity that z is connected to y. Mutatis mutandis, if z is connected to y,
z is connected to x.
Finally, to prove self-connected sum closure in general supplemented pre-
mereotopology, suppose again that x is self-connected, y is self-connected
and x is connected to y. From sum closure, there is a sum z of x and y. To
show z is self-connected, suppose that z is a sum of v and w. Then there
are four cases. In the first case, v and w both overlap x. From product
closure there is a product of x and v and a product of x and w. Moreover,
x is a self-connected sum of these products, and so they are connected to
each other, and it follows from monotonicity that v is connected to w. In
the second case, v and w both overlap y, and the reasoning is the same as
in the first case except with x replaced by y. And the third and fourth cases
are the same as in sections 6 and 7.51
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